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COMMERCIAL PEACE AND POLITICAL 
COMPETITION IN THE CROSSHAIRS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU* 
INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the mixed effect of arbitration upon the 
generation of international law norms; in particular, how arbitration 
can generate private law norms so effectively and yet still face strong 
resistance in public international law processes and controversies.  
The work of arbitration for international commercial litigation has 
been nothing less than spectacular.1  In both the private international 
and domestic civil contexts, arbitration has provided viable remedial 
solutions and functional adjudication when the law was either non-
existent or incapacitated.2  It has supplied a workable and adaptable 
trial system, which—on the international side—could also generate 
substantive legal norms.3  Arbitration thereby has redressed the fail-
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 1. There has been an explosion of interest and writing on the topic of international com-
mercial arbitration.  One source lists nearly one thousand websites on various issues in the field 
of international arbitration.  See International Council for Commercial Arbitration, Directory of 
Arbitration Websites and Information on Arbitration Available Online, www.arbitration-
icca.org/directory_of_arbitration_website.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2007).  See also Charlotte L. 
Bynum's Research Guide, International Commercial Arbitration, http://library.lawschool.corne- 
ll.edu/WhatWeDo/ResearchGuides/Intl-Commercial-Arbitration.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008); 
Georgetown Law Library International Commercial Arbitration Research Guide,  
http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/intl/guides/arbitration/ (last visited May 15, 2008); Gloria Miccioli, 
International Commercial Arbitration, in ASIL GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC RESOURCES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Kelly Vinopal ed., 2007), http://www.asil.org/resource/arb1.htm (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2008); Catherine Morris, International and Domestic Commercial Arbitration, in 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACEBUILDING: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY, 
www.peacemakers.ca/bibliography/bib10arbitration.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2008); Jean M. 
Wenger, Update to International Commercial Arbitration: Locating the Resources (May 24, 
2004), www.llrx.com/features/arbitration2.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). 
 2. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION (2d 
ed. 2007); ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (4th ed. 2004). 
 3. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 773, 804 (2002); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1183, 
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ings of sovereign politics and adversarial justice,4 achieving its great-
est success in circumstances dominated by a commercial ethos.5 
Arbitration, however, cannot transcend the essential character of 
the disputes submitted to it.  The nature of sovereign relations makes 
resolution of political disputes exceedingly difficult through any 
mechanism.  Although private commercial parties seek final and 
binding determinations, States do not.  States do not respond to 
transactional imperatives.  They engage in the politics of sovereign 
autonomy and political independence.  They demand adjustments 
and accommodations even when a law proclaims their culpability.  No 
matter how distinguished and how steeped in gravitas, a private arbi-
tral tribunal’s orders to the leader of a sovereign nation-State are 
unlikely to have practical or coercive effect, unless the marketplace 
and the entire global political community sustains the determina-
tions.6  The rule of law is less stable and is more difficult to maintain 
in political relations among States than in commercial transactions 
between private parties.7 
 
1206 (2004).  See also LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW 
MERCHANT (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., rev. ed. 1998). 
 4. See generally Howard M. Holtzmann, Arbitration: An Indispensable Aid to Multina-
tional Enterprise, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 337 (1975); Henry P. de Vries, International Commer-
cial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42 (1982). 
 5. See, e.g., RENE DAVID, L'ARBITRAGE DANS LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (1982). 
 6. International isolation, disapproval, or sanctions may not be enough to achieve the en-
forcement of ordinary adjudicatory results against States.  Even a comprehensive consensus 
within the global community can be thwarted institutionally by a single vote in the UN Security 
Council.  Because the ICJ judgments have no means of coercive enforcement, they cannot result 
in the coercive imposition of liability against the defendant State.  See Francesco Francioni, In-
ternational 'Soft Law': A Contemporary Assessment, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE 167 (Vaughn Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).  The proclamation 
of liability against the injuring State is merely one of the many steps in creating a setting and 
framework for possible, eventual resolution. 
  Inter-State conflicts are always in a process of tentative adjustment, and parties must 
wait for circumstances to yield the right setting for resolution.  Circumstances are complex, vari-
able, and unpredictable.  The political will must exist to reach an outcome of the conflict.  For 
example, ICSID awards against Argentina will be enforceable only if the domestic political au-
thorities conclude that their interests are served by the concession to liability.  That conclusion 
is potentially dependent upon an enormous number of variables—past, immediate, and future.  
Similarly, the ICJ's declaration that Iran's taking of American hostages at the U.S. Embassy was 
illegal under international law will have little, if any, impact upon the development of U.S.-Iran 
relations.  The difficult political relations between the two States involve a multiplicity of fac-
tors—from anti-Semitism and domestic politics to regional competition and economic interests 
capped off by religious sectarianism and intolerance.  Even a change of regime may not favora-
bly alter the relationship. 
 7. The finality and the stability achieved by the rule of law are optimal goals for commer-
cial and other private transactions.  For the vast majority of private parties, the ability to have 
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Nonetheless, arbitration has achieved impressive results in the 
resolution of diplomatic8 and foreign investment disputes.9  The future 
development of these sectors of arbitral activity depends upon the 
will of the parties and the evolution, often precarious, of political re-
lations in the affected area and among the implicated States.  While 
the reach of arbitration has become multi-dimensional, the irreduci-
ble difference between the types of disagreements produced by politi-
cal and commercial activity remains.  In disputes that incorporate 
elements of both categories, the success or failure of arbitration as a 
resolutory process will vary according to which element predominates 
in the circumstances.  Generally, the more commercial the political 
controversy, the more likely arbitration is to provide a suitable solu-
tion.10 
 
your day in court and to make your case constitutes a sufficient opportunity at civilized resolu-
tion.  State parties do not share this perspective.  The disposition of disputes by outside third 
parties may have some relevance, but is extremely unlikely to provide a dispositive end.  An-
tagonisms and conflicts are the lifeblood of political relations.  The political parties are unlikely 
to delegate conclusive authority to someone else; the quid pro quo of turmoil is to capture and 
maintain control and to force the other party to accede to your demands.  Disputes of whatever 
kind can lead (sometimes readily) to war.  Political rule is a matter of being victorious through 
force.  On this topic, see Thomas Buergenthal, The Proliferation of Disputes, Dispute Settlement 
Procedures and Respect for Rule of Law, 21 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 126 (2006). 
 8. See, e.g., Henri C. Alvarez, Arbitration Under the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, 16 ARB. INT'L  393 (2000); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its 
Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1416 (2003); David A. Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Reso-
lution under NAFTA's Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 481, 
484 (2000); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The U.S.-Iranian Dispute Settlement Accords: An Arbitrator 
Looks at the Prospects for Arbitration, 36 ARB. J. 3 (1981); Michael P. Malloy, The Iran Crisis: 
Law under Pressure, 3 WIS. INT'L L.J. 15. (1984). 
 9. See Georges R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 23 (Julian D. M. Lew ed., 1987); Nagla Nassar, Internationali-
zation of State Contracts: ICSID, The Last Citadel, 14  J. INT'L ARB. 185 (1997); LUCY REED ET 
AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION (2004). 
 10. Foreign investment in developing or re-emerging States generally involves standard 
commercial operations and well-settled contract provisions.  Unless the foreign enterprises sup-
ply security or military training, facilities, or products, they provide infrastructure or natural re-
source development.  The exercise of foreign commercial control over indigenous patrimonial 
interests and the profitability of such projects make them highly susceptible of criticism by the 
party in opposition or of reversal by the host government.  The winds of political discontent and 
eventual opposition are easy to launch in this setting.  The passion and irrationality of political 
debate often lead to arbitrary and ill-conceived policies, causing substantial harm and loss to the 
foreign investor.  Once communications break down and the dispute hardens, it may be difficult 
to retrieve the situation and gain compensation for the losses suffered.  In fact, the latter may 
not be obtainable without some form of political intervention by the investor's home State.  Po-
litical representation and espousal of claims, however, are exceedingly unlikely.  If the relation-
ship cannot be salvaged, private insurance may be the only recourse.  At this point, the attrib-
CARBONNEAU_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:19:27 PM 
314 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:311 
A business dispute about who pays for a commercial loss can be 
significant and complex  and may necessitate intricate adjudicatory 
procedures.11  The difficulty of commercial disputes pales in compari-
son to a dispute between a Western corporation about the future dis-
tribution of profits from the commercialization of a natural resource 
in an emerging country.12  A business dispute that arises in volatile 
and intense political circumstances is no longer a standard contract 
claim.  As a result, it is less susceptible to arbitral adjudication or any 
other form of resolution. 
ORIGINS AND CHARACTER OF INTER-STATE RELATIONS 
When asked to account for the proliferation of war, conflict, and 
instability in the world, a scientist once explained that the human race 
was an “aggressive species.”13  Contemporary events such as the ter-
rorist strikes on 9/11, genocide in Sudan, and “ethnic cleansing” in the 
former Yugoslavia amply validate the observation.  Even nature is 
inhospitable to humanity, as demonstrated particularly by the Black 
Death in the Middle Ages, and AIDS and influenza pandemics in 
contemporary society.14  The physical universe itself is governed by 
forces that demonstrate an indifference to, even a complete unaware-
ness of, the human species and its welfare. 
Though the brief history of the United States is marked by 
armed conflict,15 humanity’s warring instinct is hardly unique to U.S. 
history or foreign policy, or even to the 20th or 21st centuries.  The 
1400-year reign of the Roman Emperors was founded upon bellicose 
 
utes of an ordinary commercial relationship seem far removed from the transactional circum-
stances. 
 11. Arbitration is not simple-minded adjudication, and commercial litigation can be pro-
tracted and intricate.  Commercial disputes are more susceptible of resolution than their politi-
cal counterparts because of the values that prevail in these transactions and the nature of busi-
ness interests and activities. Despite the quest for competitive edge and the infliction of various 
disappointments, achieving a final resolution of the conflict that makes business sense and en-
ables the parties to move forward is the primary objective. 
 12. Many of the current ICSID cases involve such circumstances.  See Jean Kalicki, ICSID 
Arbitration in the Americas, in ARBITRATION REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS 2007 3 (2007), avail-
able at  http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/ICSID%20arbitration%20in%20the- 
%20Americas.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). 
 13. ANTHONY STORR, HUMAN AGGRESSION, intro. (1968). 
 14. Earthquakes, tidal waves, and hurricanes also attest to the many natural catastrophes 
that can, and do, befall humanity. 
 15. The warring history of the United States started with the Revolution and the Civil War 
and continued with the two World Wars, the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts, and the present-
day engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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imperial politics and the development of increasingly deadly and effi-
cient instruments of war.  Leaders such as Alexander the Great, Gen-
ghis Khan, Charlemagne, Ivan the Terrible, and to a lesser extent Na-
poleon, also achieved legendary status through belligerence and 
subjugation.16  As these examples demonstrate, aggression may well 
be the chief defining characteristic of the collective human personal-
ity.  Humanitarianism is generally an afterthought, ordinarily linked 
to religious obligation, and practiced by organizations with little, if 
any, political standing.17  Once they emerge and become stable, hu-
man societies tend to look beyond their borders and espouse con-
quest as the means of acquiring greater territory and available re-
sources. Conquest also assuages anxieties about possible vulnerability 
to attack.18  Human beings are innately competitive and insecure; they 
are challenged by the mere presence of others, and these emotions 
tend to breed nearly intrinsic aggression.19 
 
 16. The most disturbed political leaders have inflicted enormous pain on their fellow hu-
man beings in a quest for proverbial world domination, no matter how elusive and illusory that 
objective has always proven to be.  Individual freedom and personal development are distinctly 
inconsequential as compared to survival when these leaders become dictators pursuing a grand 
mission.  The acts of Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, and Mao and, to a lesser extent, Osama Bin Laden, 
Hugo Chavez, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are recent examples of the inhumanity to which 
unrequited needs and aberrant political views can give rise.  Although they represent more so-
ber and rational calculations, the arms race and the international sale of weaponry also fuel the 
campaign for contemporary supremacy and posthumous recognition.  They, too, exploit insecu-
rities.  They feed aggression, greed, and paranoid ambition and allow these character flaws to 
parade as a means of protecting national security,  preserving cultural integrity and achieving 
historical equity among societies.  In the nuclear age, civilization will remain vital and humanity 
will continue (and even prosper) as long as hate is tempered and lunatic beliefs eradicated.  In-
dividual demise is inevitable and unavoidable, but death at a collective level is a truly unaccept-
able outcome. 
 17. See, e.g., TAYLOR B. SEYBOLT, HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE 
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE (2007); Global Policy Forum, Humanitarian Interven-
tion? Empire?, www.globalpolicy.org/empire/humanint/index.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).  To 
illustrate the point further, both the International Chamber of Commerce (www.iccwbo.org) 
and the International Bar Association (www.iba.org) were founded in the aftermath of the 
Great War.  Their purpose was to avoid another similar conflagration.  While both institutions 
developed successfully in many respects, their laudable objective was obviously not realized. 
 18. Human beings, in effect, are impelled by variable and contradictory tendencies.  They 
need to form families and to establish social architectures for satisfying basic needs.  These posi-
tive propensities, however, are accompanied by an equally strong desire to destroy or appropri-
ate the same foundational structures in other groups. 
 19. Indeed, both collectively and individually, the human personality is beset by emotional 
pathologies.  See HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY (Robert Hogan et al. eds., 1997).  
Conflicted psychological dispositions make the use of force by human beings irrational, exag-
gerating its necessity and intensity and often transforming it into a bloodlust.  The distortion of 
reality afflicts both the leaders and members of human societies.  It is endemic in human beings 
to be plagued by feelings of dissatisfaction and a sense of void.  Life appears simultaneously to 
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History also teaches that human beings are most irretrievably 
committed to, and willing to fight about, abstract beliefs such as reli-
gious or political convictions.  With the exception of the ancient 
world, human societies often unilaterally and coercively seek to im-
pose their inalterable views of divinity upon others.  When others re-
ject our beliefs, we are particularly threatened because these beliefs 
are acquired early in life, and have become fundamental existential 
tenets and part of our psychological core.20  At a community level, the 
strength of these beliefs is demonstrated in the emotions that sur-
round rituals and traditions that constitute society’s cultural persona.  
Disagreements about the place and significance of iconic manifesta-
tions are likely to be vehement and can readily escalate and explode, 
and may also express other, more political, ideological, or economic 
antipathies and antagonisms.  Political rhetoric can cloak the underly-
ing motivation for aggression and make it appear more justified.  In 
many respects, “plausible deniability” is the ultimate political maneu-
ver or “trick.” 
Thus, the historical expression of the human personality estab-
lishes the political relations among States. Politics represents a 
merger of the human warring instinct with belief systems and emo-
tional dispositions.  The often-intoned supplications for peace and 
harmony remain unfulfilled entreaties and rhetorical reflexes in hu-
manity’s political experience.  Competitiveness, insecurity, and ag-
gression not only bring us to engage in murderous practices, but also 
to the brink of self-extinction.  Battles about sovereignty, territory, 
cultural or religious beliefs, and basic necessities trace the “flat-line” 
progression of humanity through time.21  The conflicts are ordinarily 
intractable, compulsively repeated, and completely resistant to effec-
tive resolution.  If it is attempted at all, dispute resolution is generally 
lengthy, riddled with obdurate positions, and filled with suspicions 
and calumnies. The process involves unyielding and uncompromising 
contests of self-interest.  Therefore, though it is frequently and gener-
 
be purposeful and purposeless.  The anxiety of existence is quelled by constant efforts to outdo 
death by leaving an immortal legacy or at least by becoming so preoccupied with temporal am-
bitions that mortality is forgotten or recedes into the background.  Historical figures are re-
membered, revered, or reviled by people who never knew them or lived with them.  Even im-
mortality is an impersonal imagery and good only until the next epoch emerges from a celestial 
cataclysm. 
 20. Because it takes great effort, pain, and time to assess, question, and adjust basic beliefs,  
rational reconsideration of beliefs is generally ignored. 
 21. The best contemporary illustration is the apparently endless quest to achieve peace and 
stability in the Middle East, the so-called Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
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ously described as the “art of the possible,”22 politics is far from being 
the highest expression of human development.  It borrows much from 
the base and instinctual human personality. 
THE CHOICE BETWEEN INSTINCT AND REASON 
Fear, insecurity, and the need to establish control by domination 
are akin to untamed nature and the mechanical operation of the 
physical universe.  They are estranged from the use of reason and un-
affected by the right of choice possessed by free beings.  They take 
place automatically and inevitably, as a result of fixed and irresistible 
patterns. This natural determinism can be overcome or, at least, sub-
dued by human reason.  Understanding is humanity’s most redemp-
tive attribute because it provides a means by which the species can be 
salvaged, maintain its existence, and even acquire a level of success.  
Plainly, human existence consists of a constant pull between reason 
and instinct.  Comprehending the express and underlying meaning of 
circumstances, the interests at play, and the costs of accomplishment 
or of the lack of accomplishment can engender enlightened and intel-
ligent action and more desirable and durable outcomes.  Prescient in-
sight can lead to magnanimity, constructive policies, and rational 
practices, allowing humanity to escape its destructive instincts and 
avoid its own progressive annihilation. 
Dispute resolution is constructed on the same dynamic.  Cardozo 
once described the act of judging as intermediating between history, 
social needs, practical consequences, long-standing legal rules, and 
basic fairness.23  A true judgment or decision cannot be rendered 
without a meaningful understanding of these inter-related factors.  
Reconciliation and accommodation of conflicting interests in order to 
produce consensus do not imply surrender to mediocrity or abdica-
tion of principle.  Rather, consensus-building establishes a founda-
tional platform upon which human resourcefulness and adaptability 
can advance the ends of civilization.  A lucid understanding of the de-
ficiencies and expanse of human personality and the emergence and 
dynamics of conflict is a necessary first step to creating the stability 
that leads to civilization. 
Making a conflict adversarial has the opposite effect.  It has the 
same impact as politicizing a conflict.  Polarization sets in almost in-
stantly.  Reasonableness and rationality are replaced by a strident and 
 
 22. Quote attributed to Otto von Bismark. 
 23. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
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uncompromising desire to win, essentially at any cost.  Any conces-
sion or possible lack of determination to win is seen as weakness.  
Mixed considerations are confusing; unequivocal positions are con-
vincing.  Truth is not a limitation on argumentation—“spinning” 
propositions and deluding the decision-maker are the real objectives 
of advocacy.  Adversarial dialogue represents, in effect, a declaration 
of war.  The stakes and interests at issue are the same as in a military 
confrontation; victory and peace are synonymous.  Trials are based 
upon aggression, the intensity of which is exacerbated by the oppos-
ing parties’ insecurity and apprehension that the other side might be 
stronger and more likely to triumph.  Controlling perceptions, no 
matter how deceptive and false the result, is the primary goal of the 
confrontation. 
Adversarialism not only dominates the system of trial, but also is 
present to varying degrees in political debate, journalism,24 and educa-
tion in American society.25  The introduction of an adversarial ele-
 
 24. Generally, adversarialism extinguishes the informational function of news reporting.  
For example, Michael Barone, a senior writer for U.S. News & World Report, asserts that 90% 
of journalists in the United States are Democrats.  Michael Barone, The News Media, REAL 
CLEAR POLITICS, Apr. 3, 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/04/the_news_me- 
dia.html.  Fox News buttresses its claim of being "fair and balanced" with its hiring patterns.  
According to Barone, 65% of the Fox News journalists are Republicans.  Mr. Barone illustrates 
the taint in the news media (and also, I would argue, in the schools) by relating an anecdote.  
Speaking with a CBS News executive, Barone alleged that the news media was biased because 
of its overwhelming Democrat affiliation.  The executive responded that, although the tilt was 
undeniable, journalists were professionally objective.  Replying, Barone asserted that, if journal-
ists functioned without regard to their personal political beliefs, why not hire Republicans?  The 
executive made manifest the depth of his ideological conviction and leanings by responding that 
news reporting would then be biased.  See Michael Barone, Happy birthday; the new media, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 2, 2006, http://www.usnews.com/blogs/barone/2006/8/2/happy-
birthday-the-new-media.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).  The selection and presentation of 
"news" topics are twisted and tailored to express the partiality underlying the conveying of 
facts.  It is more important to manipulate and mislead the public than inform it. 
 25. Today, some "politicized" schools began to stand between students and parents on the 
basis of social policy issues.  For example, a middle school in Maine dispensed contraception to 
twelve and thirteen year olds without parental consent or notification.  Maine middle school to 
offer birth control, CNN, www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/10/18/middleschool.contraception.ap/in-
dex.html (last visited March 25, 2008).  Ironically, these schools feared developing independent 
minds capable of analyzing reality and reaching their own conclusions, thereby creating their 
own sense of values.  Although the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
exposed the historical fallacy of communism, many of the blunt and intrusive tactics of the de-
funct empire have been introduced and are practiced in this country.  These educational en-
claves substitute counseling and "appropriate" behaviors for the competition of academic 
achievement and distinction, just like Soviet courts would command ordinary citizens to attend 
so-called trials to experience and benefit from their socialist teachings.  See Tait Trussel, Politi-
cal Correctness Suppresses Education, available at www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=6460 (last 
visited March 25, 2008); Augustin Blazquez and Jaums Sutton, Political Correctness: The 
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ment into these fields degrades their integrity and the outcomes they 
yield. When it engages in adversarialism, humanity, although adorned 
in the garb of sophistication, is only a few steps removed from its 
primitive origins; conquest and the acquisition of advantage are the 
sole purpose of the exchange. 
THE LIBERALITY OF COMMERCE 
In his celebrated lectures on “The Western Tradition,”26 the late 
Professor Eugene Weber described the gradual rise in Europe of the 
mercantile and financial communities between the 14th and 17th centu-
 
Scourge of Our Times, www.archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/4/4/121115.shtml (last 
visited March 25, 2008); Anita Vogel, Textbook Change Draws Charges of Political Correctness, 
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,85594,00.html (last visited March 25, 2008); THOMAS E. 
CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND 
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 35, 53 (1989). 
  In some schools, adopting "correct" values is far more important than the objective 
pursuit of knowledge.  Future voters are more valuable than future thinkers.  See generally Paul 
M. Weyrich, The Islamic School Book Controversy, Apr. 9, 2003, 
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCommetary.asp?Page=%5CCommentary%5Carchive%5C20030
4%5CCOM20030409c.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).  See also AFTER POLITICAL 
CORRECTNESS: THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIETY IN THE 1990S (Christopher Newfield & Ronald 
Strickland eds., 1995).  In some universities, it is sport to attack mainstream American values.  
American capitalism is seen as a form of savagery rather than a creator of prosperity for the 
greatest number.  War is always wrong when undertaken by America, but never criticized when 
its enemies engage in it.  Guns, Christianity, and the belief in the traditional family are all indi-
cators of the intolerance and moral degeneration of American society, while Hollywood ob-
scenities that masquerade as art, the mutilation of women by the indigenous practices of foreign 
cultures, and the beheading of innocent people are all acceptable practices because they take 
place elsewhere.  The lunatic belief that the Bush Administration was complicit in 9/11 is an-
other illustration of the disinformation that cascades within the academic and entertainment 
left.  The critique generally becomes diatribe— a unilateral and unfair evaluation.  The oppo-
nents of the United States are always more persuasive than our own public officials who take 
pride in, and defend, our country.  See, e.g., Bill Lind, The Origins of Political Correctness, 
www.academia.org/lectures/lind1.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); Philip Atkinson, Political Cor-
rectness, www.ourcivilisation.com/pc.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); ANTHONY BROWNE, THE 
RETREAT OF REASON: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC DEBATE 
IN MODERN BRITAIN (2006); OUR COUNTRY, OUR CULTURE: THE POLITICS OF POLITICAL 
CORRECTNESS (Edith Kurzweil & William Phillips eds., 1995).  This approach, which is more 
widespread than is tolerable or fair, betrays the trust that tenured professors owe students and 
their families.  Though the students who suffer these systems are often bright enough to learn 
on their own, they are deprived in substantial part of the benefit of the original bargain for intel-
lectual development and analytical understanding, which are the essential offerings of educa-
tion. 
 26. See EUGEN WEBER, 2 THE WESTERN TRADITION: FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE 
PRESENT (5th ed. 1995); EUGEN WEBER, 1 THE WESTERN TRADITION: FROM THE ANCIENT 
WORLD TO LOUIS XIV (5th ed. 1995); Eugene Weber, The Western Tradition (WGBH Boston 
television broadcast 1989), available at www.learner.org/resources/series58.html (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2008) [hereinafter The Western Tradition]. 
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ries.27  Venice and Amsterdam were the centers of European com-
mercial activity and development.  London, comparatively speaking, 
emerged more slowly as a trading city.  Eventually, England would 
become known as the “nation of shopkeepers.”28  The birth of a com-
mercial class in society represented a landmark event that would alter 
the distribution of power and promote a new image of humanity 
grounded in peace and prosperity.  Competition would shift in part 
from a military landscape to the higher, less turbulent plains of capital 
markets and urbane culture.29 
In his discussion, Professor Weber emphasized the striking con-
trast between the dynastic policies of European princes and the pro-
tocol and practices of the mercantile class.30  The royals responded to, 
and exacerbated, religious divisions among peoples and countries in 
order to engage in war, thereby enhancing the appearance of their 
omnipotence.  Financiers and traders avoided the assault on belief 
systems then in vogue, deeming it transitory and counterproductive in 
a business environment.  Merchants did make money from the politi-
cal exploits of princes by providing them with capital to conduct mili-
tary campaigns.  Mercantile activities, however, had a much wider, 
longer, and more creative scope.  Loans and insurance were made 
available for all types of adventures and projects, near and far.  In ef-
fect, through its private activity, the merchant class established urban 
and regional economic centers and financial practices that at least ri-
valed, and supplanted to a degree, the State and its hegemony.31  Both 
government and the people needed money to pursue their ambitions 
and build a more productive existence. Those who supplied the oper-
ating capital became vital and, therefore, very powerful. Succinctly 
stated, merchants put hate and political bickering to the side and con-
centrated on profit. 
Desisting from political wrangles was the first characteristic of 
the nascent merchant class.  Additionally, it was transborder in char-
acter.32  The centers of European commerce reached out to one an-
other and to the existing global marketplace.  Capitalism, almost in-
trinsically, had an international reach.  The betterment of self and 
 
 27. See The Western Tradition, supra note 26, Lecture No. 24: The National Monarchies.  In 
the following account, I have interpreted Professor Weber's lecture at various points. 
 28. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 253 (T. Nelson and Sons 1884) (1776). 
 29. The Western Tradition, supra note 26, Lecture No. 24: The National Monarchies. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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station had universal appeal.  Political boundaries were not a signifi-
cant or limiting factor to the enterprise.  Although the commercial 
centers competed for international business, they also reinforced each 
other in self-interested cooperation.  Everyone who contributed to 
the transaction could share in the profits it yielded.  Commercial val-
ues were defined and prevailed.  The private agreement was the pri-
mary source of regulation.33 
A third and final attribute of the merchant class and its endeav-
ors was the development of a rich community culture and a pervasive 
ethic of tolerance.34  These aspects contrasted sharply with the need of 
princes to control people and events and to glorify their own person-
alities in an unending quest to maintain power.  As commercial activi-
ties increased, trade practices became more sophisticated and the en-
vironment in which business was conducted gained importance.  The 
bankers in Venice left their benches and created arcades or galleries 
in which to conduct their transactions.35  Trading companies were 
formed and the selling of shares and payment of dividends provided 
the supply of necessary capital, enhanced profitability, and distributed 
the risk of commercial ventures over a larger group.36  Amsterdam so-
lidified its standing as the frontispiece of mercantile capitalism by 
constructing magnificent buildings and sponsoring cultural events and 
sophisticated forms of entertainment. 
With wealth came culture—art museums, splendid public gar-
dens, and grandiose architectural structures to maintain—which at-
tracted even more business.37  The trading cities were cosmopolitan 
and practiced tolerance.  Entrepreneurs needed to be free to engage 
in their transactions, engage in trade, move capital, and follow their 
instincts on the market.  They required the freedom to do as they 
pleased in the context of their enterprises, to take the risk of realizing 
their full potential, and to be creative in their pursuit of wealth.38  
Averseness to external regulation was present at the very inception of 
mercantile activity.  Individual liberty was not a political ideal, but a 
remarkable boon of business necessity.  In effect, the yearning for 
prosperity engendered the miracle of tolerance.39  Government’s task 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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was to maintain the order required by social stability and avoid the 
disruption of the marketplace by the untoward, unnecessary, or even 
impolitic use of force.40  The impact of piracy, which has resurfaced in 
the contemporary age, upon maritime interests illustrates the useful 
role of government in the conduct of national and global business. 
The hijacking of ships and cargo raised substantially the cost of trans-
portation and made transactions less tenable and efficient.  It further 
compromised consumer interests and lessened prosperity by reducing 
economic activity.  General security is necessary to the conduct of 
business.  Making money, in effect, defanged controversies about be-
liefs and harnessed human instincts, thereby erecting a basis for the 
cooperative intersection of self-interests.41  Wealth-creation competed 
with historical immortality for the energies of humankind. 
In sum, freedom of action is a hallmark of commercial activity.  
Entrepreneurial commerce generates prosperity and thereby benefits 
the larger community.  Commercially vibrant communities are attrac-
tive places to live and establish businesses.  It goes without saying, 
however, that commerce has its own blemishes and imperfections.42  
The conduct of business is a competitive, sometimes ruthless, enter-
prise; the anxieties of risk-taking can lead to ugly, and even illicit, be-
haviors.  Transactions can generate conflicts and problems between 
partners and result in failure.43  In contrast to political activity, where 
the most primal instincts of the human personality are dominant, 
commerce embodies a view of humanity that is more balanced be-
tween instinct and civilization, that draws as much, if not more, en-
ergy from the latter than the former.  Humanity acting in its role as a 
merchant is less prone to destructiveness and, ironically, is less driven 
by avarice.  Commercial competition needs others, and business be-
 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See, e.g., AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF,  THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE 
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1993); LOREN FOX, 
ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL (2002); ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO AND THE 
DEATH OF ENRON (2002); Ameet Sachdev, Unbowed Black Gets 6 1/2 Years, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 
11, 2007, at 1 (discussing Ex-Sun-Times chief who was ordered to forfeit $6.1 million in fraud 
proceedings); Martha Stewart Will Pay $195K To Settle Civil Insider Trading Charges with SEC, 
COURTTV.COM, Aug. 7, 2006, http://www.courttv.com/trials/stewart/080706_ap.html (last vis-
ited March 25, 2008) (explaining that Martha Stewart had to pay about $195,000 and became 
ineligible to act as the director of a public company for five years under a settlement on civil 
insider trading charges with the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 43. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPS: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
GRABBING AND LEAVING  (1990); ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: 
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS (2d ed. 1998). 
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comes, in effect, a way of life for entire communities.  Difficulties fu-
eled by unrelenting antagonism are resolved not by military force but 
by the urge to discover workable solutions to conflict. 
In its purest form, commercial behavior is simultaneously self-
centered and other-regarding.  The world need not be conquered, but 
can be accommodated through pragmatic exchanges, creative adapta-
tions, and workable solutions.  Profit and prosperity demand that 
business parties seek broad-gauged, constructive dispute resolution 
that maintains the participants’ dignity, preserves goods and property, 
and proffers a basis for continued relations.  As a general proposition, 
when humanity practices commerce, it exhibits more responsible and 
mature behavior.  Politics and other adversarial struggles are based 
upon infantile perceptions, conflicts, and aspirations.  In these set-
tings, the contest is a singular undertaking, the conflicts involve life-
and-death stakes, and the would-be resolution must be completely 
fulfilling to the one winning party.  They reflect the love-hate dilem-
mas that characterize early existence. 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PURSUANT TO THE BUSINESS 
ETHIC 
Merchants have never much prized adversarial litigation as a 
means of dispute resolution.44  The features of the process respond to 
political values and convictions.  Instead of a public proceeding with 
results reflecting lay views, merchants prefer a confidential and expert 
process.  The politically commanded form of adjudication is ill-suited 
and impractical for the resolution of commercial disagreements.45  
Merchants want those disagreements resolved by other, equally 
knowledgeable merchants who apply trade practices and respect the 
expectations of the marketplace.  Simple commercial sense argues 
strongly against subjecting commercial interests to the risk of court-
room theatrics.46  Jurors constitute one evident problem; lawyers and 
judges—who are versed principally, if not exclusively, in the law—
 
 44. See generally ERIC HELLAND & ALEXANDER TABARROK, JUDGE AND JURY: 
AMERICAN TORT LAW ON TRIAL  2 (2006); Klaus Peter Berger, Lex Mercatoria and Lawyers—
Moving Away From Traditional Legal Theory, OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 
2004, available at http://tldb.uni-koeln.de/php/ogemid.php?page=ogemid.php (last visited Apr. 
10, 2008); ALAN STITT, MEDIATING COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2003); KARL MACKIE, DAVID 
MILES, & WILLIAM MARSH, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: AN ADR PRACTICE GUIDE 
(2000). 
 45. See generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 1-5. 
 46. See id. 
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another.47  Remaking commercial problems into legal issues is dan-
gerous.48  It could lead to ill-adapted judicial outcomes, far removed 
from mercantile realities. 
Accordingly, the merchant class’ proclivity for freedom and tol-
erance brought about a need for self-administered, adapted justice.  
Party negotiations, obviously, should prevail if possible.49  Third-
parties could assist the disagreeing parties in reaching an accommoda-
tion.50 In situations in which the disputes were unresponsive to these 
efforts and involved large sums of money or were otherwise critical, 
final and binding adjudication was the only means of unraveling the 
impasse.  Arbitration had always been attractive to the business com-
munity.51 Unlike court proceedings, it achieved many commercially 
desirable objectives.52 Arbitrators are appointed by the parties and 
are generally commercial people with a good understanding of the 
trade and party dealings.  Their experience and expertise allow them 
to render decisions that reflect commercial exigencies. Procedural 
maneuvers do not dictate the outcome.  The fate of a commercial bar-
gain should not turn upon advocacy’s traps and ambushes.  In an eco-
nomic and disciplined proceeding, the arbitrators give each party a 
reasonable opportunity to address allegations and to make their case.  
Once the evidence is in place and final statements have been made, 
the arbitrators deliberate and render a succinct determination.  Ap-
peal of the ruling is available only upon truly exceptional grounds 
that betoken procedural corruption or another form of injustice.53  
The bargain for arbitration is for a reasonably fair but expedited ad-
judicatory proceeding and a binding expert determination.  Disputes 
should not fester and their resolution linger.54  Protracted, obdurate 
adjudication squanders limited resources and valuable opportunities.  
There is even a risk of losing the contest.55  The trade will not wait for 
otherwise occupied business parties. 
 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See sources cited supra note 44. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2. 
 52. Id. at 1. 
 53. See id. at 30-33. 
 54. See id. at 2. 
 55. See id. 
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These features of arbitration are well-established and have been 
well-documented.56  Expertise, efficiency, and effectiveness in dispute 
resolution suit the commercial spirit.  What is new about arbitration is 
its enhanced scope of application.57  In fact, arbitration’s new jurisdic-
tional reach portends a new standing and systemic function for the 
process.  Broader application, however, brings new hazards and is not 
necessarily likely to be accompanied by arbitration’s traditional seam-
less remedial success.58  On the domestic side, thanks to the rulings of 
the U.S. Supreme Court,59 arbitration escaped its commercial isola-
tion and spread to all areas of civil dispute resolution.60  With the 
Court’s enthusiastic blessing, it began to be applied in disparate-party 
transactions and to the resolution of public law controversies.61  In ef-
fect, consumers and employees were required to arbitrate by manu-
facturers and employers.  Compulsory recourse to arbitration gener-
ated criticism and brought about challenges to the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements.62  Some groups perceived the displacement of 
judicial authority in adjudication as an untoward use of contract 
power.  Despite the manifest failings of the judicial process, critics 
saw the use of arbitration as an intrusion upon the public mandate 
and its unilateral imposition a fundamental unfairness.  Political turf 
is not easily surrendered or readily shared and distortions abound 
when ideologies clash. 
Internationally, arbitration also superseded its traditional status 
as a private legal system for Euro-American commercial transac-
tions.63  It extended its reach to all multinational commercial disputes 
 
 56. There are now comprehensive bibliographic guides to the literature in the area.  The 
volume of the literature has grown exponentially.  See, e.g., HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV 
PECHOTA, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION—AN INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY  (2d ed. 2002). 
 57. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 248-95, 305-51. 
 58. See id. 
 59. The Supreme Court has decided more than 35 cases dealing with arbitration in the past 
55 years, beginning with Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, in 1953, to its most recent decision, Buck-
eye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
 60. Id. 
 61. The arbitrability of statutory rights is evidenced in the Supreme Court's statement that, 
"'we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the 
competence of arbitral tribunals' should inhibit enforcement of the act 'in controversies based 
on statutes.'"  Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (citing Mit-
subishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985)). 
 62. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). 
 63. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-14 (1972).  See also Elizabeth 
Jackson, Recent Development, The Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses under M/S Bre-
men v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 377 (2001). 
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and became a mechanism for processing commercial claims with sov-
ereign parties.64  Further, arbitration attenuated the commercial con-
sequences of political revolutions and changes of political regime.65  
Finally, it made global business possible between Western parties and 
emerging States and countries that embrace different political ideolo-
gies and legal traditions.66 
 
See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).  See also Gail Elaine Papermaster, Note, 
Will the Courts Scherk the Little Old Lady in Dubuque? The Impact of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 
on the Individual Investor in a Global Securities Market, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 129 (1985). 
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).  See also, 
e.g., Charles H. Brower II, Mitsubishi, Investor-State Arbitration, and the Law of State Immunity, 
20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 907 (2005); Lisa M. Ferri, Note, Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims Aris-
ing from International Commercial Disputes Recognized Under Federal Arbitration Act, 17 
SETON HALL L. REV. 448,  471-72 (1987); Ronald E. M. Goodman, Note, Arbitrability and Anti-
trust: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 655, 
655-56 (1985). 
See also Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533-39 (1995).  
See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Clark, Note, Foreign Arbitration Clauses and Foreign Forum Selections 
Clauses in Bills of Lading Governed by COGSA: Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky 
Reefer, 1996 BYU L. REV. 483, 489-94 (1996); Stuart C. Gauffreau, Note, Foreign Arbitration 
Clauses in Maritime Bills of Lading: The Supreme Court's Decision in Vimar Seguros Y Rease-
guros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 395, 411 (1996). 
 64. See Barton Legum, Lessons Learned from the NAFTA: The New Generation of U.S. 
Investment Treaty Arbitration Provisions, 19 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 344, 344-
48 (2004); Sophie Lemaire, Treaty Claims et Contract Claims: la compétence du CIRDI à l'é-
preuve de la dualité de l'Etat, [2006] REVUE L'ARBITRAGE 353; Julian D.M. Lew, ICSID Arbi-
tration: Special Features and Recent Developments, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES 267 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Kröll, eds. 2004); Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, The Role of 
ADR in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The ICSID Experience, NEWS FROM ICSID, Winter 
2005, at 12-14; Giorgio Sacerdoti, Investment Arbitration Under ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules: 
Prerequisites, Applicable Law, Review of Awards, 19 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 
1, 3-34 (2004); Ole Spiermann, Individual Rights, State Interests and the Power to Waive ICSID 
Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 ARB. INT'L 179 (2004). 
 65. See Bernard Audit, Les "Accords" d'Alger du 19 janvier 1981 tendant au règlement des 
différends entre les Etats-Unis et L'Iran, 108 J. DE DROIT INT'L "CLUNET" 713 (1981); 
RAHMATULLAH KHAN, THE IRAN – UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, CONTROVERSIES, 
CASES AND CONTRIBUTIONS (1990); THE IRAN – UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981–
1983, 104-35 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1984). 
 66. See Michael Moser, China – Hong Kong Enforcement Arrangement Becomes Effective, 
15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 24, 24-28 (2000); Vratislav Pechota, China International Eco-
nomic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), 4 WORLD ARB. REP. 4315 (2000); Le 
Cong Dinh, Arbitration in Vietnam, 11 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 164, 167 (2000); Komar Mu-
lyana & Jan K. Schaefer, Indonesia's New Framework for International Arbitration: A Critical 
Assessment of the Law and Its Application by the Courts, 17 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 39 
(2002); Vincent Godbillon, La Problématique Actuelle de l'Arbitrage Commercial International 
Russe, 17 BULL. SWISS ARB. ASS'N 285 (1999). 
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The success of arbitration in each of these new sectors has been, 
and may continue to be, variable.67  The imperative for arbitration be-
tween North American and European parties may not be so un-
equivocal in other contexts that are influenced by a multitude of dif-
ferent considerations.  In the North American-European sector, 
without a willingness and ability to arbitrate, parties could only en-
gage in self-help or have recourse to municipal court litigation.68  The 
latter approaches are inapposite because each of them represents an 
expensive means to a generally ineffective end.69  In this regional sec-
tor, arbitration facilitates trade by supplying a workable international 
trial system—a trial process that is neutral, expert, reasonably effi-
cient, effective, and final.  The success of international arbitration is 
also due to its autonomy from domestic regulatory authority.70 
Transborder arbitration is not as popular or effective where par-
ties’ differences outweigh their shared dispositions, and where com-
peting interests are less malleable, the work of arbitration is more dif-
ficult and likely to be an approximation.  For example, during the last 
fifteen years, many Latin American countries have endorsed interna-
tional commercial arbitration.71  Many of them have adopted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law72 as a symbol of their commitment to the ef-
fective future application of the process.  The reality of implementa-
tion, however, may be less than the impression conveyed by the ad-
 
 67. After its initial success, CIETAC arbitration has "cooled" considerably because of 
problems with the integrity of  arbitrators.  The Argentine response to the enforceability of 
ICSID awards will be critical to the continued recourse to arbitration in Latin American coun-
tries.  See Carlos E. Alfaro & Pedro M. Lorenti, The Growing Opposition of Argentina to ICSID 
Arbitral Tribunals: A Conflict Between International and Domestic Law?, 6 J. WORLD 
INVESTMENT & TRADE 417 (2005). 
 68. See Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, supra note 3, at 1187-94. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 430-31. 
 71. See NIGEL BLACKABY, DAVID M. LINDSEY, & ALESSANDRO SPINILLO, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA (2003); Jean Kalicki, ICSID Arbitration in 
the Americas, supra note 12; Michael T. Sprague, Comment, A Courageous Course for Latin 
America: Urging the Ratification of the ICSID, 5 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 157 (1983) (advocating the 
ratification of the ICSID Convention by Latin American countries). 
 72. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL] 
MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1985) (amended 2006), avail-
able at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2008).  To date, four Latin American countries have enacted new national legis-
lation on arbitration based on the Model Law.  Several other Latin American countries have 
passed new arbitration laws that incorporate the Model Law but with emendations.  See JAN 
KLEINHEISTERKAMP, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
(2005); Horacio A. Grigera Naón, Arbitration and Latin America: Progress and Setbacks, 21 
ARB. INT'L 127 (2005). 
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hering rhetoric because a system granting full faith and credit to arbi-
tral awards has yet to materialize.73  The Japanese response to arbitra-
tion also illustrates the lukewarm international reception of the proc-
ess.74  Despite its significant commercial position and modern 
legislation on arbitration, Japan is a less-than-enthusiastic proponent 
of the process.  Its history and cultural sentiments point to mediation 
as the preferred remedy for resolving disputes.75  In fact, arbitration in 
Japan sometimes resembles mediation.76  Though international arbi-
tral awards are fully enforceable in Japan, and Japanese companies 
do participate in arbitrations, this conduct may well be a pragmatic 
concession to Western business interests rather than an acceptance of 
arbitration as an effective method of dispute resolution.77 
Of the Asian countries, Singapore is the jurisdiction most hospi-
table to the Western consensus on arbitration.78  It has established an 
arbitration center that provides administrating services and promotes 
business recourse to the Western process.  China has its own form of 
institutional arbitration, CIETAC,79 which represents a real, albeit 
modest, concession to the global practice of arbitration.  The Chinese 
government appears unwilling to recognize an external process.  It 
would rather convert its prior trade regulation bureaucracy into a 
Westernized adjudicatory process, operating on its territory and ulti-
mately subject to its political control.  Even communist dictatorships 
in transformative evolution are unwilling to forgo advantage.  The 
 
 73. See KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 72; Naón, supra note 72, at 172-76. 
 74. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL 
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 363 (2005); see David A. Livdahl & Asako Yamagami, Arbi-
tration in Japan, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ASIA 137-200 (Philip J. 
Mcconnaughay & Thomas B. Ginsburg eds., 2d ed. 2006); David J. Przeracki, Note, "Working it 
Out": A Japanese Alternative to Fighting It Out, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 149, 164 (1989). 
 75. Przeracki, supra note 74, at 156-60, 163-66. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Livdahl & Yamagami, supra note 74; Przeracki, supra note 74, at 159-60 (compar-
ing Western law in Japan to an "heirloom sword" which is taken out and shown to outsiders but 
never actually used). 
 78. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 286 (2007). 
 79. See, e.g., Cedric C. Chao & James Schurz, International Arbitration: Selecting the Proper 
Forum, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Feb. 2007, at 17; Sally A. Harpole, Factors Affecting the 
Growth (or Lack Thereof) of Arbitration in the Asia Region, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 89 (2003); Huang 
Yanming, The Ethics of Arbitrators in CIETAC Arbitrations, 12 J. INT'L ARB. 5 (1995); 
SELECTED WORKS OF CHINA INTENATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION 
COMMISSION AWARDS (Priscilla Leung Mei-fun & Wang Sheng-chang, eds., 1998); Pechota, 
supra note 66, at 4315; Wang Sheng-chang, Practical Aspects of Foreign-Related Arbitration in 
China, in ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN 45 (1997). 
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standing of Hong Kong in terms of international commercial arbitra-
tion remains to be defined and clarified.80 
By far, the Arab countries are the least hospitable jurisdictions to 
international commercial arbitration for a variety of political and reli-
gious reasons.81  Saudi Arabia,82 despite its ratification of the New 
York Arbitration Convention and other similar international instru-
ments,83 is in effect quite hostile to Western transborder arbitration.  
Iran recently ratified the New York Arbitration Convention,84 but the 
current regime possesses a knee-jerk antagonism to anything Western 
or non-Muslim.  Repressive and oppressive governments are unlikely 
to foster the conduct of global business.  Tentative accommodations 
are often reached for reasons of necessity and with the hope of even-
tual amelioration or extinction. 
ARBITRATION AND POLITICS 
Under U.S. law, arbitration has a statutorily-recognized impact 
upon sovereign status.  According to the “arbitration exception”85 to 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, sovereign status can-
 
 80. See Mark Lin, Enforcement of Mainland China's Arbitral Awards in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region After 1 July 1997, 65 ARB.: J. CHARTERED INST. ARB. 56 (1999); 
Robert Morgan, The Arbitration Act 1996 and Arbitration Law Reform in Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore: A Brave New World?, 1997 ARB. & DISP. RESOL. L.J. 177, 177 (1997). 
 81. CARBONNEAU, supra note 74, at 365. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. The New York Arbitration Convention entered into force on January 13, 2002 in Iran.  
Status of UNCITRAL Conventions and Model Laws, www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.convent-
ions.membership.status/un.arbitration.recognition.and.enforcement.convention.new.york.1958.h
tml (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). 
 (a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States or the of the States in any case 
. . . . 
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign 
state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differ-
ences which have arisen or which may arise between the parties with respect to a de-
fined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable 
of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award 
made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitration, if (A) the arbitration takes place or 
is intended to take place in the United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be 
governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States 
calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, (C) the underlying claim, 
save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a United Sates court 
under this section or section 1607, or (D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise 
applicable. 
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2000). 
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not block the enforcement of an arbitration agreement or award.  
Once a State enters into an arbitration agreement, it waives its sover-
eign immunity from suit and execution and consents, as a matter of 
law, to the jurisdiction of the court to achieve enforcement.86  The 
federal policy on arbitration demands the removal of barriers to arbi-
tration no matter what their basis in law might be.  U.S. law provides 
that the only parties who benefit from immunity in the context of ar-
bitration are the arbitrators and the arbitral service-providers.87 
Arbitration’s direct role in the resolution of commercial disputes 
that arise from, and implicate, sovereign interests and policies is a vo-
cation-in-the-making.  Because disputes with a political element tend 
to be imperturbable, arbitration’s resolutory performance (as noted 
earlier88) has been more tentative and less spectacular. The Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal89 was the first contemporary experi-
ment with arbitration in politicized areas.  More than a decade later, 
it was followed by the less-significant Iraqi War Claims Commission.90  
The latter’s mission was compromised by a would-be lack of oil reve-
nues.  The Iran-United States Tribunal was more remarkable because 
there were monetary resources for its operation and satisfaction of 
orders for compensation. The funding came from the worldwide 
freezing of Iranian assets, one of the crowning achievements of the 
Carter Administration.  The Tribunal was intended to allow private 
companies and individuals to seek compensation for the commercial 
losses they suffered as a result of the Iranian revolution.91  It also al-
lowed the adverse State parties to confront each other on the ques-
tion of compensation and other matters.92  It may have been the first 
 
 86. See id. 
 87. See David J. Branson & Richard E. Wallace, Jr., Immunity of Arbitrators under United 
States Law, in THE IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATORS 85 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1990); see also, e.g., 
Martin Domke, The Arbitrator's Immunity from Liability: A Comparative Survey, 3 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 99 (1971); Mark W. Levine, The Immunity of Arbitrators and the Duty to Disclose, 6 AM. 
REV. INT'L ARB. 197 (1995); Richard J. Mattera, Has the Expansion of Arbitral Immunity 
Reached Its Limits After United States v. City of Hayward?, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 779 
(1997); Andrea Mettler, Immunity v. Liability in Arbitral Adjudication, 47 ARB. J. 24, 26 (1992); 
Michael D. Moberly, Immunizing Arbitrators from Claims for Equitable Relief, 5 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L. J. 325 (2005). 
 88. See sources cited supra notes 65-67. 
 89. See supra note 67. 
 90. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 464. 
 91. See, e.g., David P. Stewart & Laura B. Sherman, Developments at the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal: 1981-1983, in THE IRAN-US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-1983 4-5 (Richard B. Lil-
lich ed., 1984). 
 92. Id. at 5. 
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time that a victor (who, additionally, had won on its home turf) be-
came accountable for the economic consequences of the political 
strife it initiated and conducted.  The rules of arbitral procedure con-
tained the violence of the political disagreement between the two 
sovereign countries.93  In effect, arbitral adjudication, customized to 
the incidents of sovereignty and adjusted to specific situations, pro-
vided the measure of stability and order by which to redress commer-
cial grievances and allocate compensation.  The sovereigns, however, 
would never have been so inclined had assets not been frozen. 
States have also used arbitration to address trade regulation and 
policy.  Although the Disputes Settlement Body (DSB) within the 
World Trade Organization (WTO),94 formerly the GATT,95 has been 
enhanced to achieve expedited coercive results, the NAFTA process96 
is a vehicle of even greater transborder innovation.  The WTO proce-
dures apply exclusively between sovereigns and address economic 
policy disagreements between Member States.97  Despite the imposi-
tion of real procedural restraints on the processing of claims,98 the 
prospect of final enforcement of a DSB ruling often dims and eventu-
ally disappears in the haze of political temporizing.  Sovereign discre-
tion, in any context, is difficult, if not impossible, to mitigate.  It can-
not be eliminated.  The “softwood lumber” saga99 demonstrates that 
sovereignty still trumps, even though economic sanctions can (techni-
cally) be imposed by the DSB on noncomplying States.  The reality of 
power cannot be ignored and the effectiveness of power relationships 
overstated. 
From a wider systemic perspective, NAFTA complements the 
WTO system by integrating affected individuals into the dispute reso-
 
 93. See, e.g., STEWART A. BAKER & MARK DAVID DAVIS, THE UNCITRAL 
ARBITRATION RULES IN PRACTICE: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL 3 (1992). 
 94. See, e.g., THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW/DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Petros 
C. Mavrodis & Alan O. Sykes eds., 2005). 
 95. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
 96. See, e.g., Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment 
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 372-73 (2003). 
 97. See THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW/DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 
94. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See DAOWEI ZHANG, THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER WAR: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND 
THE LONG U.S.-CANADIAN TRADE DISPUTE 2-4 (2007); Chi Carmody, International Decisions – 
Softwood Lumber Dispute (2001-2006), 100 AM. J. INT'L 664 (2006). 
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lution process and by creating a mechanism for advisory opinions.100  
Individuals can sue an offending State directly under Chapter 11 for 
alleged violations of the NAFTA Treaty.101  Moreover, the NAFTA 
partners have recourse to a type of advisory adjudicatory mechanism 
in Chapter 20 for resolving trade policy disagreements.102  In a number 
of celebrated cases, foreign claimants asserted that state laws and ju-
dicial procedures in the United States (in California and Mississippi 
particularly) violated the NAFTA treaty and gave rise to a right of 
compensation in the implicated commercial enterprises.103  The allega-
tions generated a firestorm of protest within the United States.104  
Opponents asserted that international attorneys acting as adjudica-
tors in a distant, elusive, and unaccountable transnational framework 
could, in effect, impose a commercial tax on the operation of democ-
ratic government.  In each case, the foreign company’s claim and po-
sition was both real and credible.105  State legislative prohibition of a 
fuel additive, for example, diminished considerably a Canadian com-
pany’s business and reduced the profitability of the enterprise.106  
Moreover, the recourse to a Mississippi jury to resolve a commercial 
 
 100. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 74, at 385-88; Marcia J. Staff & Christine W. Lewis, Ar-
bitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Past, Present, and Future, 25 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 301, 304-08 
(2003). 
 101. See RALPH FOLSOM ET AL., HANDBOOK OF NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 2-18 
(1998); LEON E. TRAKMAN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE NAFTA: MANUAL AND 
SOURCE BOOK (1997); JOSEPH A. MCKINNEY, CREATED FROM NAFTA 223-24 (2000); Asha 
Kaushal, Reconciling the Public Interest: Third Party Participation, Confidentiality and Privacy 
in NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 9 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 172, 172  (2006). 
 102. MCKINNEY, supra note 101, at 28-30. 
 103. See Loewen Group, Inc. and Loewen v. U.S., (Can. v. U.S.), 7 ICSID Rep. 442, 42 
I.L.M. 811, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (2003); Memorandum Opinion of the U.S. Dist. Ct. 
Dismissing Loewen's Petition to Vacate Arbitral Award, In re Arbitration Between Loewen v. 
U.S., No. 04-2151 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2005); Methanex Corp. v. U.S. (Can. v. U.S.), IIC 167 
(UNCITRAL/NAFTA Ad Hoc Tribunal 2005), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/ 
IIC_167_(2005).pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2008); Metalclad Corp. v.  Mexico (U.S. v. Mex.), IIC 
161, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000),  available at www.investmentclaims.com/IIC_161_ 
(2000).pdf. 
 104. See Public Citizen, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Cases: Bankrupting Democracy 
(2001), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF186.PDF; New Study Analyzes Seven Years of 
Corporate Investor Challenges to Democratic Governance under NAFTA, 
www.organicconsumers.org/Corp/DolanReport.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). 
 105. Some commentators argue that the Chapter 11 cases do not constitute a coherent deci-
sional law with clear and fixed legal rules on the propriety of State regulation of regional com-
mercial conduct.  Critics see the Chapter 11 cases as an infringement of State sovereignty, but 
that assessment is almost undeniably an exaggeration meant to fuel a political agenda.  See Staff 
& Lewis, supra note 100, at 328-29. 
 106. See Methanex, IIC 167 at 1, 26. 
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claim against another Canadian corporation violated, in all likelihood, 
due process of law and treaty obligations in light of the jury’s track 
record in favor of plaintiffs.107 
Especially in the fuel additive case, by considering whether the 
company was entitled to compensation,108  NAFTA tribunals recog-
nized—perhaps for the first time in an adjudicatory context—that 
States could be held responsible for the commercial consequences of 
their regulatory decisions.  Political authority could be exercised for 
the public, but not without private accountability. The economic im-
pact of regulatory law could be effectively determined and measured.  
The cases provoked a vehement outcry among ideological groups.  
The protests “encouraged” reconsideration of preliminary determina-
tions and even the allegiance to the transborder investment regime.109  
The criticisms threatened to undermine the independence and legiti-
macy of NAFTA arbitration.  In fact, some commentators suggested 
that NAFTA arbitrators should have less of a commercial vintage and 
be more “politically experienced” so that more “suitable” results 
could be reached.110  In politics, ornamentation is everything; the abil-
ity to obfuscate and make grandiose but vacuous statements is a veri-
table art form.  Succinctly stated, NAFTA is not a concession by po-
litical actors to commercial interests.  It is effective only when its 
procedures and results fit the political convenience of the circum-
stances.  The opportunity to encircle  political will with the rule of law 
appears to have been lost. 
The reference in NAFTA and in Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs)111 to ICSID arbitration revitalized World Bank arbitration and 
 
 107. See Loewens, IIC 254.  See also William S. Dodge, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States 
and Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 155, 156-57 (2004); Emmanuel 
Gaillard, 'Loewen v. U.S.A.': New Ground in NAFTA/ICSID Arbitration, N.Y. L.J. Apr. 5, 
2001, at 3. 
 108. See Methanex, IIC 167.  In Metalclad v. Mexico (U.S. v. Mex.), IIC 161, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000), for example, the U.S. investor brought a Chapter 11 action against 
Mexico because the government of a Mexican state refused to issue a construction permit to 
allow it to reopen a waste disposal facility.  The tribunal ordered Mexico to compensate Meta-
clad for its investment loss (the purchase of a Mexican company which owned the site).  Critics 
saw the determination as a violation of State sovereignty over environmental regulations.  See 
Staff & Lewis, supra note 100, at 322. 
 109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 110. Interview with Armand de Mestral, NAFTA arbitrator, in McGill Law Faculty, Mont-
real, Quebec, Canada  (Summer 2005). 
 111. See Antonio R. Parra, ICSID and Bilateral Investment Treaties, NEWS FROM ICSID 
(ICSID, Washington D.C.), Spring 2000, at 11; Eduardo Savarese, Investment Treaties and the 
Investor's Right to Arbitration between Broadening and Limiting ICSID Jurisdiction, 7 J. 
WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 407, 410 (2006); Margrete Stevens, Experience in Arbitrations 
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gave it a chance at a new day.112  In fact, ICSID arbitration is currently 
the primary mechanism for adjudicating foreign investment claims in-
volving Latin American countries.113  The arbitrations involve volatile 
political claims arising out of commercial contracts and transactions.  
Foreign investors seek to develop and commercialize the natural re-
sources of the host State; the natural resources can range from water 
and oil to minerals and lumber.114  While a private contracting party is 
not entitled to modify a contract unilaterally without liability, the cir-
cumstances of conducting a commercial transaction between a West-
ern party and a developing State agency or government involving 
would-be patrimonial interests may alter or eliminate that settled 
principle of contract law.  Although ICSID tribunals may apply stan-
dard legal rules in reaching their determinations, it remains to be seen 
whether their rulings will be “accepted” by the foreign State against 
which they are rendered.115 
The systematic use of arbitral adjudication to address politicized 
commercial disputes in the world community is novel and proffers 
hope for establishing the stability necessary for future global prosper-
ity.  As noted at the outset of the discussion, the utility of arbitration 
in this area is far removed from its accomplishments in international 
commercial litigation among private parties.  Political actors believe 
in the cultivation of advantage (through alliances, disinformation, or 
 
under ICSID Rules  Pursuant to Bilateral Investment Treaties, 29 INT'L BUS. LAW. 377, 377 
(2001); Jeswald Salacuse, Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a 
Grand Bargain, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 51, 69 (Norbert Horn ed., 
2004). 
 112. See David R. Sedlak, ICSID's Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can 
the Momentum Hold? 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV 147, 149 (2004). 
 113. See, e.g., Gonzalo Biggs, The Latin American Treatment of International Arbitration 
and Foreign Investments and the Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 19 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT L.J. 61, 69 (2004); Charles Chatterjee, Investment-Related Promissory Notes Are 
Investments under the ICSID Convention: Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezula, 3 J. WORLD 
INVESTMENT 147 (2002); Alejandro Escobar, Bolivia Exposes 'Critical Date Ambiguity', 
GLOBAL ARB. REV., June/July 2007, at 17; Francisco Gonzalez de Cossio, The International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: The Mexican Experience, 19 J. INT'L ARB. 227 
(2002). 
 114. See sources cited supra note 112; see also Alexia Brunet & Juan Agustin Lentini, Arbi-
tration of International Oil, Gas, and Energy Disputes in Latin America, 27 NW. J. INT'L L. & 
BUS. 591, 591-92 (2007). 
 115. See, e.g., Alfaro & Lorenti, supra note 67; Enron Corporation v. Argentine Republic 
(U.S. v. Arg.), IIC 292, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 (May 22, 2007); Compania De Aguas Del 
Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal  S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Fr. v. Arg.), IIC 307, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/3 (Aug. 20, 2007).  See also Gus Van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction 
in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims Against the State, 56 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 
371, 392 (2007). 
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aggression).  For them, arbitration provides initially a framework for 
conducting discussions and, later, a possible endpoint.  By contrast, 
commercial parties espouse the process as a means of eliminating the 
problems that impede the doing of business.  Merchants see intracta-
ble positions and the generation of irremediable conflict as costly and 
counterproductive.  In the end, the pursuit can yield an absolute loss 
for all parties.  Politicians seem to thrive on conflict; it provides them 
with an opportunity to defeat the other side.  Political leaders take 
advantage of circumstances rather than benefiting from the advan-
tages of the arbitral process.  In these circumstances, arbitration can 
only work if attachable assets exist or if the parties are willing or are 
constrained to accept its adjudicatory discipline. A mutual self-
interest and the political will to achieve a workable result must un-
dergird arbitration as a mechanism for resolving trade policy or other 
political disputes.  The possibility of manipulating the process for ad-
vantage (by altering the composition of the tribunal, for example) and  
the right to veto or unilaterally renegotiate the results increases arbi-
tration’s appeal to political parties, but reduces its credibility and ef-
fectiveness as a functional process of adjudication that can achieve re-
sults. 
CONCLUSION: ARBITRATION’S LIKELY POTENTIAL 
Despite forays into the political realm, arbitration’s bedrock 
achievements have been in its area of origin, namely, the adjudication 
of commercial claims between parties who belong to similar regional, 
political, and economic systems.  Arbitration establishes the legal 
foundation for the conduct of business at this transborder level.  
Through private arbitral trials, international business parties avoid 
the competition between national courts, their conflicting perceptions 
of jurisdiction, and the independence of the legal traditions they rep-
resent.116  As the pursuit of commerce gives rise to the miracle of tol-
erance, the use of arbitration allows for the accommodation of dis-
similar legal practices.117  The essentials of the trial can be entrusted to 
 
 116. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 74, at 353-54. 
 117. See THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE (Geoffery M. Beresford-Hartwell ed., 1997) 
(containing the proceedings of the the 1996 International Conference of the Chartered Institute 
of Arbitrators); Christian Borris, Common Law and Civil Law: Fundamental Differences and 
Their Impact on Arbitration, 60 ARB.: J. CHARTERED INST. ARBS. 78 (1994); Bernardo M. Cre-
mades, Arbitration and Business, in ICCA, SIXTH INT'L ARB. CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS 77 
(1978); Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, The "Americanization" of  International Arbitration?, 
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Apr. 2001, at 11; Lara M. Pair, Cross-Cultural Arbitration: Do the 
Differences Between Cultures Still Influence International Commercial Arbitration Despite Har-
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appointed arbitrators who will make adjustments as the proceeding 
develops.  To scholars or practitioners familiar with mixed legal juris-
dictions (Louisiana, Québec, Puerto Rico, Scotland, and South Af-
rica), achieving a procedural and substantive consensus among these 
national traditions is no less impressive than a military armistice.118  
The substantial disparity in the trial paradigm as to the role of the de-
cider, the collection and evaluation of information, the use of experts 
and other witnesses, and the character and form of the determination 
can be reconciled through  the “comparative” experience of the ap-
pointed arbitrators or through the exercise of party choice implied in 
freedom of contract or by the joint action of both factors.119 
In the North American-European context, the form of arbitra-
tion that emerged in the wake of World War II was based primarily 
on continental and civilian trial models.120  It was practiced largely by 
ex-patriate firms and lawyers, along with the local foreign bar.  U.S. 
attorneys generally favored recourse to federal courts for resolving 
international commercial claims.121  In the mid- to late 1980s, roughly 
coinciding with political triumph of capitalism and the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, American international lawyers acquiesced to 
the use of arbitration as the basic mechanism for the conduct of inter-
national commercial litigation.122  U.S. participation in the European 
trend, however, brought baggage—the use of American-styled trial 
techniques, creating a battle for establishing the central structure of 
the transborder arbitral trial.123  The essential question focused upon 
whether legal counsel or the arbitrators would control the conduct of 
the proceedings.  The American adversarial tradition attributed this 
procedural power to the litigating attorneys whereas judges per-
formed the function in the continental civilian process.124 
 
monization?,  9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.L. 57 (2002); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization 
of Arbitral Procedure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313, 1317 (2003); Serge Lazareff, Interna-
tional Arbitration: Towards a Common Procedural Approach, in CONFLICTING LEGAL 
CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 31 (Stefan N. 
Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider eds., 1999). 
 118. See, e.g., H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE 
DIVERSITY IN LAW (3d ed. 2007). 
 119. The principle of  pacta sunt servanda is instrumental both to international litigation and 
the law of arbitration.  See CARBONNEAU, supra note 78, at 299-300. 
 120. See generally Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, supra note 3, at 781-
82. 
 121. See id. at 778. 
 122. See id. at 778, 782. 
 123. See id. at 782. 
 124. See GLENN, supra note 118, at 230-31. 
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As it has in all jurisdictions with a hybrid legal heritage, the quest 
to predominate and prevail over the other legal tradition remained 
active in North American-European international commercial arbi-
tration.  For attorneys, the real concern was to engage in a trial for-
mat that was familiar in order to maximize the client’s position and 
advantages.  It was also a matter in which profound cultural assump-
tions clashed125—roughly equivalent to writing a brief in the other 
side’s language.  The battle was tempered to a considerable extent in 
light of the unquestioned status of English as the language of interna-
tional business and the substantial popularity of American legal edu-
cation among foreign commercial litigators.  The competition be-
tween major trial traditions also softened because of the intercession 
and cultural bridging work of institutional service-providers, like the 
ICC, LCIA, AAA, and Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.126  The in-
stitutions supplied arbitrators with the support necessary to reach 
considered determinations and accommodations on this issue.  Fi-
nally, as noted earlier,127 parties could arrive at their own solutions 
when they negotiated the arbitral clause. 
As Newman and Zaslowsky have argued,128 arbitral institutions 
should provide multinational parties with a choice of trial options at 
the early stage of the process.  This practice would avoid surprise and 
would also allow parties to delegate the task of determination to the 
arbitrators.  It might be useful to provide parties who disagree or are 
likely to disagree with a trial model that integrates the basic features 
of both the adversarial and inquisitorial trial systems.  For example, 
given the absence of a jury and the arbitrators’ experience and exper-
tise, the rules for gathering and weighing evidence could be relaxed 
and arbitrators given a greater role in ordering and conducting dis-
covery.  Expert witnesses, as is now the case,129 could be required to 
 
 125. See  id. 
 126. Id. at 368-69. 
 127. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 128. See Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, Cultural Predictability in International 
Arbitration, N.Y. L.J., May 25, 2004, at 3, reprinted in CARBONONNEAU, supra note 74, at 493. 
 129. See PROTOCOL FOR THE USE OF PARTY-APPOINTED EXPERT WITNESSES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Chartered Institute of Arbitrators), available at 
http://www.lcia.org/CONF_folder/documents/PeterReesProtocolfortheUseofExpertWitnessesin
InternationalArbitration.DOC (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).; David Howell, Use of Experts In 
International Arbitration, ASIAN DISP. REV., Apr. 2005, available at http://www.fulbright.com/ 
iages/publications/use%20of%20experts%20in%20international%20arbitrationdjh%20_2_.pdf; 
THE EXPERT IN LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (D. Mark Cato ed., 1999); Doug Jones, Use of 
Experts in Arbitration; Independent Experts- The Common Law Approach, TRANSNAT'L DISP. 
MANAG., Nov. 2005, at 2, 17. 
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testify together and engage in a colloquy with the arbitrators under 
the supervision of counsel.  Live testimony should not be discouraged 
or presumptively displaced by written evidence.  Cross-examination 
of witnesses should be an accepted feature of the arbitral trial, along 
with a verbatim record of the proceedings if only to act as a means of 
supplying the tribunal with accurate information.130 
After many years of formative churning, the development of ar-
bitration in the North American–European sector has reached a pla-
teau of uniformity and consensus demanded by its application in a re-
gion with an integrated sense of history, culture, and values.131  
Uncertainty, however, resides in transplanting the process into other 
regional areas of the global economy and having it apply in politicized 
circumstances that involve sovereign parties and mixed conflicts.  
Emerging and reemerging countries in Eastern Europe, the former 
Soviet Union, and Latin America rightly see their future in global 
commerce and understand that transborder arbitration is the “sup-
porting beam” of the world marketplace. Even the remaining 
staunchly communist regimes, like China and Vietnam (with the pos-
sible exception of Cuba), recognize the necessity of global commerce 
and how vital arbitration is to its existence. 132  Whether antagonisms 
and political and religious diversity can be corralled to achieve com-
mercial prosperity and override the antipathies and bloodlust of yore 
remains to be seen.  The voice of arbitration has a different resonance 
outside the tolerant confines of the North American-European trad-
ing city, but it is whispering the tune of a more rational and tolerant 
destiny for humankind. 
 
 
 130. See Paul D. Friedland, Combining Civil Law and Common Law Elements in the Presen-
tation of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Sept. 
1997, at 25, 28; see also Peter R. Griffin, Recent Trends in the Conduct of International Arbitra-
tion: Discovery Procedures and Witness Hearings, J. INT'L ARB., March 2000, at 28-29. 
 131. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 74, at 362. 
 132. See Lucy V. Katz, How International Arbitration Bridges Global Markets in Transition 
Economies, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LITIG. (CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution, 
New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2004, at  145 available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/fulltext/109609872/PDFSTART; Magnus Andrén, Enforcement of an Arbitral Award in the 
People's Republic of China, STOCKHOLM ARB. REP., 2000, at 73; John Mo, Probing the Uni-
formity of the Arbitration System in the PRC, J. INT'L ARB., May 2000, at 1; Pip Nicholson & 
Nguyen Thi Minh, Commercial Disputes and Arbitration in Vietnam, J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 2000, 
at 1. 
